The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War

Product Description

In this account of one of the worst intelligence failures in Americanhistory, James J. Wirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. Wirtz reconstructs the turning point of the Vietnam War in unprecedented detail. Drawing upon Vietcong and recently declassified U.S. sources, he is able to trace the strategy and unfolding of the Tet campaign as well as the U.S. response.

Review

“A fascinating book. Combining the disciplines of history and political science with insights from psychological theory, Wirtz has produced both a pathbreaking analysis and a cautionary tale.” — Heath Twichell ―
Naval War College Review

“This excellently researched and written volume is a positive addition to our understanding of the event that marked the turning point in U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.” — John R. Finch ―
Military Review

“Wirtz analyzes both the North Vietnamese plans and the American effort to counter them in exquisite detail…. His book is a valuable addition to our knowledge of the Vietnam conflict and the pitfalls facing an intelligence effort to divine an enemy’s plans.” — Roger Hilsman ―
Political Science Quarterly

“Wirtz provides a persuasive explanation for how the Vietnamese achieved surprise at Tet, even though the Americans had intelligence warning them of the attack. His book should be required reading for those interested in this key aspect of the Vietnam War and in the study of intelligence failures.” — Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. ―
Journal of American History

About the Author

Peter R. Lavoy is Director, Counterproliferation Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. Scott D. Sagan is Associate Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. James J. Wirtz is Professor of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School and author of The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War, also from Cornell.